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Light-duty vehicles are amazing artifacts, made by the world’s largest
industry and fueled by the second-largest. American automakers
make a new light vehicle every 2 seconds. Cheaper per kilogram
than a fast-food hamburger, those vehicles meet conflicting require-
ments for performance, emissions, fuel economy, esthetics, and
safety with remarkable skill. Yet, a typical light vehicle releases its
own weight in carbon dioxide annually, and each day it consumes
gasoline made from about a hundred times its own weight in ancient
plants (Lovins et al. 2004). Cars and light trucks use 42% of
America’s 10,000 gal/second oil habit and account for 58% of pro-
jected growth in U.S. oil use to 2025 [Energy Information
Administration (EIA) 2004].
At the root of the problem is technology that has improved
only incrementally, not radically, since the 1920s. After more than
a century of devoted engineering effort, today’s cars use < 1% of
their fuel energy to move the driver: only 13% of the fuel energy
reaches the wheels, and just 6% accelerates the vehicle, 95% of
whose weight is its own, not the driver’s. Two-thirds (or, not
counting accessory loads, three-fourths) of the fuel use is caused by
the car’s weight (An and Santini 2004), and each unit of fuel saved
at the wheels saves an additional seven units of fuel lost en route to
the wheels. Obviously, then, the most powerful way to reduce fuel
use and emissions of cars is to reduce their mass radically—say,
by half.
Automakers have not yet taken this approach very seriously
because they assumed reducing mass meant using light metals such
as aluminum and magnesium, whose cost is barely justified to save
gasoline that in the United States costs less than bottled water, and
because they thought lightweighting would compromise safety in
collisions with heavier vehicles. Fortunately, these objections are now
fading. Both carbon fiber composites and light, high-performance
steels now hold promise of equal or better economics and safety with
roughly redoubled fuel economy—after it has already doubled by
today’s best hybrid-electric powertrains (Holzman 2005; Lovins and
Cramer 2004; Lovins et al. 2004). Moreover, even the relatively
costly advanced composites may not make cars costlier: the cost of
their extra materials can be offset by simpler automaking and smaller
power trains (Lovins et al. 2004). Thus an ultralight hybrid-electric
vehicle could cost slightly more because it is a hybrid, but not
because it is ultralight, and it could repay its extra cost in 3 years,
equivalent to buying gasoline at just $0.57/gal ($0.15/L) (Lovins
et al. 2004). This assumes no further innovation; yet, Toyota’s
hybrid power trains, being based largely on software and electronics,
have improved more in the past 6 years than U.S. nonhybrid ones
have in the past 26 years.
The attractions of superefficient, cost-effective, but uncompro-
mised vehicles can be further increased by public policies that use
neither mandates nor fuel taxes (Lovins et al. 2004). Most important
are revenue- and size-neutral “feebates”: within each size class, buyers
of efficient cars get rebates, paid for by corresponding charges on
inefficient cars. This causes producers to add efficiency improve-
ments up to the rebate value; buyers to consider fuel savings over the
vehicle’s life, not just the first few years; and both parties to profit.
This and other lighthanded policies (smart procurement, “golden
carrot,” and “platinum carrot” rewards to
reduce the risks and increase the rewards of
innovation, low-income scrap-and-replace
programs) can speed ultralight hybrids to
market by 2010 and give them a 90–100%
market share by 2040. In contrast, the U.S.
government forecasts (EIA 2004) that without business- or policy-
driven innovation, light vehicles will spend the next 20 years getting
1.5 miles/gal more efficient than they were in 1987, and even incre-
mentally improved versions that save a quarter of the fuel and pay
back in a year—as proposed by the National Research Council
(2001)—will scarcely sell at all.
What will most create this automotive revolution, though, is
not public policy but market competition. Toyota already has
greater market capitalization than General Motors, Ford, and
DaimlerChrysler put together, and their last profitable niche—big
sport utility vehicles and pickups—is under frontal assault by
Japanese and European firms. Next comes China, which intends to
become a major exporter by 2010, has a visionary efficiency- and
leapfrog-based energy policy, and is unlikely to export cars as inef-
ficient as most U.S.-made ones, which are gradually becoming ille-
gal to sell under China’s new efficiency standards. How long will it
take before you drive home a Wal-Mart-badged superefficient car
from Shanghai Automotive? Maybe as little as a decade. The issue
for the United States is only whether to import efficient cars to
replace foreign oil or to make efficient cars and import neither the
oil nor the cars.
Both competitiveness and security concerns reinforce the already-
strong economic case for the United States—and others—to stop
using oil altogether. Traditionally, this was assumed to require
government policies to force something basically uneconomic (or we
(Lovins et al. 2004) found that saving half the oil (at an average cost
of $12/barrel in 2000 dollars) and replacing most or all of the rest
with advanced biofuels and saved natural gas (at an average cost
below $18/barrel) costs less than the private internal cost of buying
oil in the world market, even if its externalities were worth nothing.
Thus the transition beyond oil can be led by business for profit, and
if done right, it can also rejuvenate the economy. Given supereffi-
cient vehicles, hydrogen (Lovins 2004) is the most efficient and prof-
itable way to use the saved natural gas, but is not essential to
displacing oil.
Other innovations can help, too (Hawken et al. 1999). Too
many people driving too many kilometers in too many cars will not
work, even if the cars are very clean and efficient: we will simply run
out of roads, land, and patience rather than air, oil, and climate. By
no longer subsidizing and mandating sprawl, we can already be
where we want to be, so there is no need to go elsewhere. We can
move only electrons and leave the heavy nuclei at home. We can
have real competition at honest prices between all ways of getting
around or not needing to, so drivers get what they pay for and pay
for what they get. As Alan Durning says, what we need is not better
cars but better neighborhoods (Tyson 1998), so we can make cars
“an accessory of life rather than its central organizing principle”
(Durning 1998). 
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